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Introduction
For forty-five years the Cold War had dredged on, leaving millions of citizens throughout
the United States and the Soviet Union in a constant state of fear. With hundreds of nuclear
warheads pointed at each other, the fate of two world powers, and billions of citizens stood in
danger, with tensions coming to a head in instances such as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of
April 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. While these tensions had been at a
continual high throughout the 1960s and 1970s, they began to lessen as General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev took office in the Soviet Union in 1985. As these tensions lessened, an
eventual decision was made between US President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev to stage a
meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss the possibility of denuclearization. Reagan went into
the Summit with a primary goal of avoiding nuclear war. He saw this summit as an opportunity
to showcase the strength of US diplomacy by working through the timid US and USSR relations.
Meanwhile, Gorbachev viewed this Summit as way to modernize the Soviet Union. For the first
time in decades, the country was placed on a national stage of democracy/diplomacy, and
Gorbachev not only saw this as a chance to showcase the Soviet Union as more than a restrictive
communist country, but also as an opportunity to help the Soviet Union survive its shrinking
strength. This summit left the entire world at a standstill, as the Cold War faced the possibility of
an apparent conclusion, as one of the most important geopolitical meetings of the twentieth
century was about to take place.
This Reykjavik Summit was planned for the dates of October 11 – 12, of 1986. The
location of Reykjavik was chosen as a neutral meeting ground between the two countries, as
Iceland had remained neutral throughout much of the Cold War conflict. The timing of the
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meeting was also set at an excellent time for Gorbachev and Reagan to meet with one another, as
both had openly recently expressed interest in denuclearization and peace talks. Challenges arose
1

almost instantaneously though, as the meeting was scheduled with less than two weeks’ notice.
Nonetheless, the lead up, and the actual event of the summit, became an extremely important
precursor for the end of the Cold War.
The primary sources that define this paper are extremely vast and plentiful and help
create a complete picture of the events that occurred leading up to, during, and after the
Reykjavik Summit. A majority of the featured primary sources are composed of media

interviews conducted with President Reagan. Other examples of primary sources are reflected in
pieces such as journals from numerous individuals involved in the events, and multiple national
addresses given to the populations of both the United States and Soviet Russia. One of the best
strengths held by these primary sources is the fact that there are a large number of primary
sources from Soviet Russia, including translated sources into English from Russian. These
sources help create a complete picture of the events surrounding the summit, since they include
speeches from the leaders meeting in the event, and they also include memoirs and letters from
those involved. The one limitation provided by the summit itself, that is reflected in the sources,
is that it is an extremely short, two-day event, meaning that many of the sources repeat. While
there are still plentiful sources, it often becomes difficult to find new, useful information. There
is also an extremely heavy number of secondary sources, with pieces looking deeply into
historiography and the impact of items such as the SDI and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty.
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Together , these plentiful primary and secondary sources will combine to help create a complete
and thorough picture of the Reykjavik Summit and the subsequent affairs.
The impact that the Reykjavik Summit had on the conclusion of the Cold War, and the
concept of denuclearization remains one of heavy debate. Along with this debate, the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as the Star Wars program, has become widely
regarded as not only the ironic conclusion to the Reykjavik Summit, but also the final piece that
drove the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. The most prominent accomplishment achieved
from the Reykjavik Summit was the advancement of the strength of Star Wars, and its assistance
in global denuclearization. Before the occurrence of the summit, the only debate over nuclear
weapons had involved simply lowering the number of weapons in the world, with plans to reduce
nearly the 8,000 worldwide weapons to half in the timespan of five years. Having the
opportunity for the two leaders to meet completely revolutionized any previous talks, as
conversations of complete denuclearization were discussed. These conversations of
denuclearization were drawn by biparty discussion of the immorality of nuclear weapons, as the
2

weapons were unilaterally agreed upon as weapons of mass destruction that were not to be used.
The eventual breakdown over the summit drew from the SDI, and Reagan’s refusal to remove it
from discussions. As the Economic and Political a rticle argues, Reagan’s insistence on the SDI
was both ironic and possibly meaningless. The irony behind the event was that removing nukes,
as Gorbachev had proposed, would have had the same effect as building the SDI, as both would
have essentially eliminated the threat of nuclear weapons. This point of irony became a smear
campaign for Russian media after the event, as they saw denuclearization as an affair that would
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lead to the same outcome as building the SDI. Along with this, the question is risen about
whether or not Reagan even intended to build the SDI, or if it was simply a ploy to bankrupt the
3

Soviets. Together, these pieces examine how the SDI affected the end of the Reykjavik
Summit, and the contributions that the Summit had on denuclearization and the conclusion of the
war.
This paper will examine the effects of the SDI on the Summit and the effects of
denuclearization, and it will also examine the effects that the Summit had on the end of the Cold
War. This paper will also aim to examine the effects of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev
on the summit, and how each of their individual psyches affected the discussions. Not only will
this paper aim to address the actual Summit, it will delve into the lead up of the summit,
examining affairs through Roberts Schultz’s personal memoirs, along with the effects of the
conclusion of the Summit. The conclusion and aftermath of the Reykjavik Summit is nearly as
important as the meeting itself, as it led to a subsequent Washington D.C. Summit that produced
agreements and treaties that began during discussion at Reykjavik. This paper argues that the
beginning of the conclusion of the Cold War started with the discussions held at the Reykjavik
Summit, as both the Strategic Defense Initiative and the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and
Ronald Reagan, combined to both begin the gradual denouement of the Summit and the Cold
War.
Reykjavik Precursor
The briefing for the Summit began instantaneously after the date for the meeting was
agreed upon, as hundreds of government officials met to discuss planning. While the
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announcement time for the meeting was less than a week before the actual meeting, the United
States government still had created numerous contingency plans for a potential meeting
beforehand. These plans held the US position on nearly every conceivable nuclear position, and
laid an important framework for summit preparation. Secretary of State George Shultz, who
stood closely involved in the meeting preparation, stated that “The summit would not be
prenegotiated. But we were prepared.” Both sides intently studied previous documents on the
4

issue, examining treaties and similar agreements that had been made before this event.  The
uniqueness of the proposed treaties meant that there was no precedence, and the United States
would very much be going into this event without knowing fully what to expect from Gorbachev.
Domestically, the United States was undergoing both midterm elections and a budding
nuclear movement. These midterm election were going to occur less than a month after
Reykjavik, and Reagan saw this meeting as an important benchmark for keeping many
Republicans in office. Along with midterm elections, a growing social movement known as the
Nuclear Freeze Movement was gaining traction. This movement, founded by Randall Forsberg,
became a public response to the slow drift towards nuclear war between the United States and
the Soviet Union. This movement quickly gained popularity in the United States, and even
became a part of the Democratic Party’s platform. This movement began pushing state and local
candidates that supported their platform, and also started pushing legislation that supported
nuclear deterrence. While the Reagan Administration attempted to avoid this movement,
eventually it was forced to respond, with Reagan’s National Security Advisor stating “We took it
as a serious movement that could undermine congressional support for the [nuclear]
4
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modernization program, and potentially…a serious partisan political threat that could affect the
5

election in `84.” While this movement never directly the Reagan Administration’s reelection
chances, it stood as an added piece of pressure on the meetings, as mass public outcry pushed for
the removal of nuclear arms from the US arsenal.
The standing of the Reykjavik Summit also upped the sense of urgency behind the
planning. The Höfôi House had been chosen due to its remoteness, and a mass media blackout
was put into place to limit the distractions at the event. Both of the leaders were very well aware
that the event was going to feature heavy amounts of one on one time, and that both leaders were
going to be forced to handle hard hitting questions that would not have any previous script. This
sense of urgency upped the importance of the meeting, and also showcases why the meeting was
6

so important.

The Summit
Both sides had spent substantial amounts of time briefing the morning of the event, and
through these briefings the United States was able to uncover substantial information about the
Soviets that assisted with the meeting. It had become clear to the Reagan Administration,
through a Central Intelligence Agency briefing, that the Russian army stood against the meeting,
as Gorbachev’s openness to making agreements with the United States worried the military.
With this being the case, Gorbachev would only survive the summit if it was viewed as a
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perceived success for the Soviet Union. This placed the Gorbachev Administration into a
difficult position, as Gorbachev’s goal as Soviet Premier was to modernize the Soviet Union,
which would involve Western diplomacy and democratic agreements. Due to this goal,
Gorbachev was either forced to go against his preconceived notion that needed to be reached to
achieve Soviet survival or continue with his plans and face removal from office upon his return
from Iceland. This military disdain against Gorbachev had reached such a crux that there were
8

some premature plans to assassinate the leader, unbeknownst to Gorbachev. Because of this CIA
briefing, the Reagan Administration was clearly placed in an advantageous position, allowing
them to negotiate more freely heading into day one of the meeting.
The two first began their arrival at the meeting spot of the Höfôi house at around 10:30
am, with Reagan’s party arriving first. While Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev were the
two most prominent figures at the meeting, the other two key figures that sit in on each of the
meetings were that of Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz. Shevardnadze stood as the
Soviet Union’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, while George Shultz stood as the United States’
Secretary of State during this time. Upon the all arrival of all four figures to the meeting room,
subsequent pictures, and greetings took place as a formal precursor to the meeting. While these
events were occurring, numerous intelligence agents and strategic analysts continued to define
9

what a successful event would hold for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Eventually
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though both leaders were finally able to sit down and begin the long-awaited discussions that
would attempt to proceed one of the world’s most potentially dangerous wars to a more
non-hostile affair.

(Hofdi House, Reykjavik, Iceland, YoYoGo.com)

When the meeting began, it became ultimately clear that both world leaders were on
different pages in what they wanted to accomplish. Gorbachev quickly opened up the meeting
wanting to discuss ridding the world of its nuclear weapons, while Ronald Reagan wanted to
discuss the Soviet Union’s numerous human rights violations. Reagan invited Gorbachev to
speak first, who quickly opened on potential Soviet nuclear concessions. Reagan made it
extremely clear that for a truly successful meeting to take place, concessions would have to be
made on not only nuclear arms, but human rights as well. Reagan also spoke on nuclear arms
reductions to Gorbachev, stating “There is a Russian saying: doveryai no proveryai, trust but
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verify. How will we know that you'll get rid of your missiles as you say you will?” These
discussions, set both a proper potential path for agreements to be made, and also illustrated the
divide between the two world leaders. While Gorbachev solely wanted to focus on nuclear
weapons, Reagan saw much more of an importance on human rights, and the Soviet’s numerous
violations. While Gorbachev had aimed to modernize the Soviet Union, he was not fully
prepared to transfer the Soviet Union over to a modern country when it involved treatment of its
citizens. Along with this, much of the industry of the Soviet Union was not prepared for such a
transition, as the industry was not capable of sustaining such a change. This disagreement over
human rights becomes the first true issue of disagreements between the two leaders, but the
disagreements would quickly subside as Reagan accepted that agreements on nuclear weapons
were more of a pressing matter.
The discussions over human rights quickly subsided, as conversations quickly
transitioned to nuclear affairs. The two leaders first debated over the number of nuclear weapons,
as Reagan suggested lowering the number of warheads down to 4,500, as a counteroffer to the
Soviets proposed number of 6,400 – 6,800 weapons. Both leaders openly agreed that the end
goal was global denuclearization, as the number of nuclear weapons needed to be at zero before
both leaders were going to be pleased with the meeting outcomes. Gorbachev quickly wrote up a
document titled “Directives for the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and USA Concerning the
Drafting of Agreements on Nuclear Disarmament.” This document proposed sweeping
restrictions on intermediate “ strategic and intermediate-range arms, space and defense, and
nuclear testing.” This proposal also went on to state that global nuclear weapons be cut in half.
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The definition of half became the next point of contention between the leaders, as half can be
interpreted based upon types of nuclear weapons, vehicles that carry nuclear weapons, and other
similar devices. Gorbachev explained through the presentation of his document that he was
giving up a large number of concessions for the United States in order to come to agreement,
including complete disregard of British and French weaponry. This stood as a potential major
loss for the Soviet Union, as the British and French were both close allies of the United States
and were quickly building up their nuclear arsenals. This conglomeration of disagreements and
concessions highlight much of the portion of the early meeting, as the disagreements over half
11

continues to showcase the second major divide between the two leaders. These conversations
showcase both how important every single discussion was during the event, and how important
each leader was during the discussed debates.
As Gorbachev spent an extended period of time presenting his document, Reagan
addressed the next point of disagreement between the two leaders: the SDI. This subject of the
SDI and the violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty became key points of contention for
Gorbachev and Reagan, as Gorbachev requested that the United States “propose a compromise in
which we adopt the U.S. approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment and a period of negotiations
following it.” Gorbachev’s idea of a compromise involved denuclearization, as long as the
United States distanced itself from the SDI. Reagan’s response to Gorbachev’s document and
SDI plans, stressed numerous times “that success with SDI would make the elimination of
nuclear weapons possible.” Both leaders aimed to remove nuclear weapons altogether, but
Reagan obviously leaned more towards holding the SDI as it was a crucial defensive technology,
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and Gorbachev believed that no SDI would simply allow both leaders to lessen their nuclear
12

payloads and come together on a consensus. From this point forward in the meeting, both
leaders became fixated on the topic of the SDI and its impact on the meeting and the surrounding
affairs. The outcome that the SDI played on the Summit was one of extreme importance, as it
completely revolutionized nuclear warfare. While the SDI had just begun to play an impact on
the Summit, it had been a well-known worldwide weapon for three years earlier. This defense
system would become one of the most important of the twentieth century and would completely
change the entire outcome of the Soviet Union.
Background of the Strategic Defense Initiative
The creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative first became known around the globe in
1983, with Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the SDI. According to President Reagan, the SDI
would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete”, which created a problem for Soviet
13

plans for their place as a nuclear power due to threat of nuclear domination. Worldwide
reaction to the announcement of the SDI became one of primarily negative feelings, as the Soviet
Union and even fellow European allies viewed the announcement with trepidation. While the
Soviet response to the incident is more understandable, European feelings showcase a more
convoluted look at the United States’ weapon announcement. The driving three primary concerns
faced by Europeans that became the focal point of controversy involve “the reliability of
American leadership, the fate of arms control and East-West relations, and Europe’s
technological position vis-à-vis America.” (1) Because of such concerns, not only was the United
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States forced to create the SDI and navigate the justification of its creation to the Soviet Union,
but Reagan was also forced to justify the necessity of its creation to the United States’ European
14

allies.

(Ian Williams, Tom Karako, and Wes Rumbaugh, Phase One of the Strategic Defense)
Although the SDI’s influence on the conclusion of the Reykjavik Summit became one of
substantial impact, initial fear from the Soviets was of urgency, but not full catastrophe. In 1983,
General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, exhibited much trepidation about the
SDI, but also saw the opportunity to capitalize on the first announcement of the plans for the
defense system. One of the first major beliefs by Andropov and the USSR was that the United
States was simply trying to reassert military dominance over the Soviet Union during the Cold
14

Lucas, Michael. "SDI and Europe." World Policy Journal 3, no. 2 (1986): 219-49.
http://www.jstor.org.elib.uah.edu/stable/40209013.

Wiley 14
War. The Soviet leadership used this belief to attempt to portray American leadership as foolish,
as they showcased the American military as trying to find any way to solely “prevail” throughout
this cold nuclear war. Along with this reaction, Andropov and the USSR also saw the creation of
the SDI by United States forces as an attempt to further their offensive power, instead of simply
using the SDI as a defensive weapon as portrayed by Ronald Reagan. They also saw these
announcements as a compliment to Soviet forces, as the United States was attempting every
15

possible action to catch up to the massive USSR arsenal. While early sentiments did not
showcase immediate urgency behind the announcement, the United States continual desire to
build the SDI began to worry the Soviet Union and increase urgency in the administration,
especially upon transition from Andropov to Gorbachev as General Secretary.
Gorbachev’s first fears about the SDI as Soviet Secretary General became economic fears,
as the USSR began to realize the extreme expenses required to maintain the defense budget to
16

keep up with the United States. Attempting to maintain production of rival defenses to the SDI
would force the Soviet Union to completely reallocate large amounts of funds that were not
available in the USSR budget . Not only would this spending situation place the country at a
disadvantage, but it would force the USSR to sever economic ties or ignore their civilian
17

economy even more than the country already had. These early Gorbachev concerns over
spending became an ironic foreshadow for the eventual bankruptcy of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev realized that the country was either going to have to spend aimlessly to keep up with
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the SDI’s growth or ignore it and allow the United States to assert complete domination over the
Soviet Union, creating a future where the US could launch unrivaled nuclear warheads.
A final major concern of the Soviet Union over the Strategic Defense Initiative involves
the global reception of the Soviet Union and their military prowess. Before the announcement of
the SDI, the Soviet Union had clearly established themselves as an equal of the United States
when comparing nuclear strength, and even a stronger country when examining pure nuclear
armaments. Even though both the United States and Soviet Union had more than enough nuclear
weapons to destroy the planet multiple times over, it still stood as a key bragging right for the
Soviet Union. From the USSR’s standpoint, Reagan’s promise to make nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete completely destroyed the Soviet Union’s mantra as a superpower and
18

made the country’s heavy percentage of funds spent on military expenses completely useless.
As Soviet concern over the SDI continually grew, the announcement of the SDI also

brought into question the into the question the jurisdiction of many previous international peace
treaties, specifically that of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). The ABM treaty,
signed between the United States and Soviet Union on May 22, 1972, placed limitations on
nationwide defensive systems against nuclear armaments, and according to the treaty would
19

become a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic arms.” This treaty, solely created to
prevent weapons such as the SDI, banned either country from placing nationwide nuclear
defensive systems. When this treaty was passed in the mid-1970s, both the US and USSR saw
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nationwide defensive systems as an opportunity to reach nuclear invernability. Due to the lack of
defensive weapons, both sides would remain vulnerable to potential nuclear strikes, deterring
20

both the United States and the Soviet Union from launching nuclear attacks. This treaty was
created by work between both US President Jimmy Carter and USSR Secretary General Leonid
Brezhnev, and was composed when neither sides had any legitimate traction at creating
defensive nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union portrayed the SDI as a break of the ABM Treaty,
but for the Reagan Administration, unless any international power planned to enforce their treaty
breach, it made the most logical sense to create a new defensive staple for the United States.
The Strategic Defense Initiative became an impactful announcement that affected the entire
planet. While the Cold War only directly involved the United States and the Soviet Union,
discussions over the SDI reinforce the concept that the Cold War was a global war effort. Every
decision made by either country included satisfying hundreds of other countries that lacked any
nuclear firepower, each of which stood helpless to the potential nuclear fallout. Reagan was
forced to negotiate with both European allies, and the Soviet Union in order to maintain SDI
construction. While it is important to praise Ronald Reagan’s impact on the SDI negotiations at
Reykjavik, it is also important to highlight Gorbachev’s successes as in dealing with the device.
Already entering the meeting from a disadvantageous position, Gorbachev stood his ground as
the Soviet Union’s leader and managed to maintain the possibility of his two desired goals of
complete denuclearization and modernization of the country. This wherewithal sustained by
Gorbachev throughout the meeting led to another summit, one that allowed both sides to solidify
nuclear agreements. Both Reagan and Gorbachev’s impact on the conclusion of the Reykjavik
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Summit were one of great influence, although the SDI continued to drive the remaining portions
of the Summit.
Reykjavik Summit Conclusion
From the instant that the SDI became a point of topic in the meeting, the dynamic
between the two leaders completely changed. While Gorbachev had been able to negotiate with
Reagan about his stance on human rights violations, Reagan was very well aware that he held the
upper hand in negotiations on the SDI, as it stood as an item that Gorbachev both wanted to
acquire and wanted to eradicate. As the Summit progressed, Gorbachev made his thoughts on the
SDI clear, stating that the “pursuit of SDI will necessitate the buildup of strategic arms.” Reagan
quickly took offense to this comment, stating “We are accused of wanting a first-strike
capability, but we are proposing a treaty that would require the elimination of ballistic missiles
before a defense can be deployed; so a first strike would be impossible.” This quip between the
two leaders showcases much of the dissenting thought process between Gorbachev and Reagan,
as both aimed for a common goal through different means. The meeting neared its conclusion
with continued discussions over Gorbachev’s previously mentioned treaty that would allow for
21

the removal of all European nuclear weapons. While much of the staff and even Secretary
Shultz pushed for the acceptance of the treaty, Reagan continued to aim for a pursuit of the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Due to the tensions created by the SDI, Reagan even went as far to
offer the Soviet Union access to the Strategic Defense Initiative, a move in which Gorbachev
doubted. Gorbachev saw this a ploy to get the USSR to sign off on a treaty that wouldn’t be
followed through with, as he told Reagan “If you will not share oil-drilling equipment or even
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milk-processing factories, I do not believe that you will share SDI.” These two leaders
continued their debate over the SDI for the remainder of the second day, and it became clear that
the leaders were going to be unable to come to an agreement on how to reach an agreement for
removing nuclear weapons from the globe.
The meeting concluded on the afternoon of Saturday, October 12th, 1986. Gorbachev and
Reagan attempted everything possible to come to an agreement to conclude the conversations,
but nothing was ever met. At one point, discussions over the SDI came so close that Reagan
screamed at Gorbachev “We are so close!” One closing remark by Gorbachev told Reagan “We
won’t be seeing each other again”, which instantly worried many that Soviet – US relations had
completely collapsed. While George Shultz states that the quote was referring to the two leaders’
schedules before leaving Reykjavik , it still sent much of the media scrambling over the drastic
23

comments displayed by Gorbachev. Instant worldwide reactions to the Summit viewed the
event as an absolute failure. The two leaders had gotten mere moments away from ridding the
globe of nuclear weapons, yet the collapse between the two indicated that they were both
extremely close, and extremely far, from final agreements.
Immediate Summit Aftermath
After two intense days of summit discussions in Reykjavik, the event ended on the
afternoon of Saturday, October 12th. Agreements were unable to be reached between the two
powers for numerous reasons, but the two driving factors of human rights policies and the
Strategic Defense Initiative became the final breaking points between Gorbachev and Reagan.

22

George Shultz, “Cold War: Reykjavik Summit” .
23

George Shultz, “Cold War: Reykjavik Summit”

Wiley 19
While the Summit was unable to reach any concessions, it still paved the way for a future DC
Summit and began paving the way for talks of the possibility of global nuclear disarmament.
The first driving factor behind the conclusion of the meeting was the aforementioned
disagreements on human rights policies. While Reagan had originally understood that reaching
an agreement on human rights was less likely than nuclear concessions, Gorbachev’s
unwillingness to budge on the human rights violations gave Reagan much less of a tendency for
leeway to openly budge on agreements on nuclear issues. Mandating nuclear development was
much ‘easier’ in Gorbachev’s mind than overhauling the Soviet Union’s human right policies, as
it would have to be a complete and substantial system overhaul that would involve millions of
24

people. Reagan specifically spoke out against these human rights violations as a clear breach of
the Helsinki Accords, an act signed in 1975 which placed international limitations on the Soviet
Union’s human rights involvement. The human rights violations of the Helsinki Accords
thoroughly angered Ronald Reagan, with individuals such as Yuriy Orlov serving as stark
reminders of the dangers the USSR still posed. Orlov was a Russian citizen who was arrested
and imprisoned for speaking out against the government for violations of these Accords.

25

Although these human rights violations did divide the meeting, these discussions were one in
which Reagan was willing to concede on if he could reach correct agreements on other deals.
The true dividing factor between the two leaders became that of the Strategic Defense
Initiative. The base message relayed to Mikhail Gorbachev from Ronald Reagan was that the
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United States was willing to give up all forms of offensive nuclear weapons in order to focus
solely on defensive nuclear weapons. This agreement originally seemed appealing to Gorbachev,
but it became ultimately clear that Reagan was still not willing to budge on his plans for the SDI.
The SDI simply became too much for Mikhail Gorbachev, as he was unwilling to move on
26

allowing the United States to continue to operate with such a system. One of the largest
successes held from the Reykjavik Summit though was the Washington D.C. Summit that was
held as a successor to continue discussions held from Reykjavik. While the Reykjavik Summit
did an excellent job at laying the groundwork for nuclear discussions, the DC Summit allowed
for actual agreements to be made on specific terms.
Washington DC Summit
The Washington Summit held December 7 – 10 of 1987, became a monumental meeting
for the future of nuclear warfare and arms control throughout the globe. This meeting produced
multiple examples of actual treaties, including the first treaty to reduce global nuclear
armaments, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Another document that was
composed during this meeting was the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty, another piece that
looked to place limits on nuclear weapons. While nuclear discussions were still very much on the
table, President Reagan continued to slowly back down from his previous desires of human
rights agreements. “So, yes, we will address human rights and regional issues…With time,
27

patience, and will power I believe we will solve these issues.” Reagan’s change of tone on this
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issue becomes one of the largest examples of Gorbachev’s ability to leverage the impact of
nuclear disarmament to the United States, as Reagan was willing to move on his previous views
on the topic in order to reduce nuclear weapons. Regardless of Reagan’s choice to move with the
human rights agreements, the discussions held in Washington DC still proved extremely
influential.
While Ronald Reagan still viewed the DC Summit as a success, even Mikhail Gorbachev
addressed the Soviet Union’s population with successes of the summit. Gorbachev ironically
though cited the humanity of the negotiations, stating that he felt, “maybe for the first time…the
importance of the human factor in international politics.” Gorbachev not only saw the nuclear
agreements as a sign of progress for both the United States and the Soviet Union, but he also saw
the way in which he was treated as a sign of advancement for the USSR. Gorbachev explicitly
pointed out the “the friendly atmosphere, even enthusiasm to some degree… was a sign of the
changes that have begun to transpire in the West, and which meant that the ‘enemy image’ had
begun to erode, and that the myth of the ‘Soviet military threat’ was undermined…And it was
28

noticed in the entire world.” Gorbachev’s takeaway from the Washington DC Summit was one
that allowed him to attain his original goals aimed for from the Reykjavik Summit. The two
major meetings between the leaders had granted both Gorbachev and the USSR relevance on a
global scale, placing them at the negotiating table with the United States and other diplomatic
world powers. The irony behind this sentiment proves extremely apparent though, as the only
reason Gorbachev and the USSR held any modicum of relevance was due to their use of nuclear
weapons, and nothing about the country’s diplomacy, industry, or development beyond that had
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contributed to that placement. Nonetheless, Gorbachev proved correct in his statement, as the
United States and President Reagan understood the importance of deterring nuclear war.
The Reykjavik Summit and the Washington DC Summit both stand as interesting
comparisons of meetings, but without the Reykjavik Summit and the concessions settled upon at
the Hofei House in Reykjavik the discussions in Washington would have been unable to occur.
Reykjavik also became an important testing ground for planning treaties in Washington, as
points of negotiation were debated upon and removed during the Reykjavik Summit. The most
prominent example of this is the aforementioned negations over human rights. Reagan quickly
became aware that the negotiations on human rights were going to be a difficult debate to work
with Gorbachev on, allowing him to table any talks on this issue and focus solely on topics that
could be agreed upon. Because of reasons such as these, the Reykjavik Summit helped pave the
way for the treaties laid out at the Washington Summit, which continued to help advance
USSR-US relations towards the end of the Cold War.
Why Does it Matter? The Summit, SDI, and Reagan and Gorbachev
The Reykjavik Summit is such an important topic of discussion due to the impact it had
on the Cold War and the impact it had on nuclear deterrence. While the physical agreements
reached at the event were not as important as the agreements reached during the Washington
Summit, the Reykjavik Summit allowed for both powers to sit and discuss the potential of ending
nuclear war together.
The largest, most important benefit provided from the Reykjavik Summit is the theme of
precedence. The precedence set by the Reykjavik Summit is what makes the event so important,
and so monumental for global history. Since the creation of nuclear weapons, warnings about the
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danger of the use of nuclear weapons had remained prevalent, and the Cold War appeared to
bring all of these fears to stark reality. Events such as the aforementioned Cuban Missile Crisis
and the Bay of Pigs Invasion brought the world to the grips of dealing with the possibility of a
nuclear holocaust, and the discussions at Reykjavik helped curb many of these fears. While the
diplomacy provided by the United States was not shocking, the diplomacy shown by Gorbachev
and the Soviet Union provided an extremely unique dynamic to negotiations. The precedence
created from this event also helped lay the foundation for nuclear treaties at the Washington
Summit, and for many subsequent years.
While it is important to examine the importance of the precedence that was set at the
Reykjavik Summit, it is key to remember that the driving factors behind the summit were that of
Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. The impact that Ronald
Reagan had on the Summit was clear. Reagan went into the event as the key negotiator, and as
the individual that had the most amount of urgency in negotiating. Reagan not only had the
opportunity to become a global hero and end the Cold War, but he had the opportunity to cement
his legacy as an incredible negotiator. On the opposing side, Mikhail Gorbachev was aiming to
modernize the Soviet Union. Through his negotiations with Ronald Reagan, Gorbachev was able
to cement himself as both a positive negotiator, and also as someone who was able to withstand
Ronald Reagan and the United States strong level of diplomacy. Together, each of these two
leader’s charisma guided their country through the summit, and it led to the subsequent
agreements and treaties that were revealed through Washington.
Finally, the strategic defense initiative becomes the most important instrument of debate
for both Gorbachev and Reagan. This device split the debates, and along with human rights
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violations, became the primary deal breaker for the Reykjavik Summit. The largest impact that
Reagan’s insistence on the SDI had on the Soviet Union was in fact not Gorbachev’s fear of
complete US nuclear invulnerability, but instead it was the extreme amount of funding that the
Soviet Union spent on maintaining defenses to follow US defenses. Between the conclusion of
the Reykjavik Summit to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the country spent millions of
dollars attempting to research military equipment to design their own SDI, but the country was
simply unable to support it. The USSR rerouted large amounts of funds to upkeep research
budgets, and it only further fractured the splitting Soviet system. Along with all of this dynamic,
questions arise over the authenticity of the United States’ ability to even construct the SDI. As
the SDI never became a fully completed project, questions arose in hindsight over whether the
United States ever really planned to build the defense system, and if it was simply a ploy to
bankrupt the Soviet Union. While this information will never be confirmable, this could be
another potential example of Ronald Reagan’s strategic outmaneuvering of Gorbachev and the
Soviet Union.
In retrospect, the Summit can be viewed as both a success and a failure, as the impact felt
by the event played a massive effect on nuclear conversations. The sense of failure behind the
meeting was instantaneous, as both Gorbachev and Reagan spoke to their confidants about their
closeness to success. Along with this, the aforementioned comments from Gorbachev about
Reagan not seeing him again sent the media into a frenzy. Due to the lack of agreements made
during Reykjavik, the media also took this as signs of failure, allowing it to negatively reflect
upon the advancements the meeting had made during the event. While the instant reaction to the
meeting was one of perceived failure, the long-term effects of the meeting illustrated the success
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that the event created. Due to the Reykjavik Summit, the Soviet Union and United States were
able to lay foundations that provided treaties that helped decrease the number of worldwide
nuclear weapons in Washington, along with the cementing of the presence of the SDI in national
diplomacy.
Conclusion
In hindsight, Reykjavik stands as one of the most interesting events in Cold War history.
While it did stand as a successful stepping stone in relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States, it also stands as the largest ‘what-ifs’ of worldwide history. The Summit
showcased the Soviet Union’s diplomacy on an international level, as Gorbachev attempted to
reach out and expand the country’s impact. Ronald Reagan’s impact was also insurmountable on
the Summit, as he not only be was forced to coerce numerous European countries to work with
the United States on the SDI, but he also was able to stand his ground on the treaties and not give
way to Soviet intimidation. The largest piece of impact left behind from the Summit though is
the Strategic Defense Initiative. This weapon not only became the breaking point for the Summit,
but it also became the economic breaking point for the Soviet Union, as immediate fears of
concern over the weapon began even before Gorbachev’s Administration. This weapon, although
never created, becomes the key reason as to why it is so important to study the Reykjavik
Summit. It allowed the United States to set a precedent for nuclear deterrence, but it also became
one of the first ever examples of attempted limitations on nuclear weapons. Discussions on nukes
had transferred from simply attempting to place a limit on the number of weapons in the world,
to discussions of completely removing nukes altogether, which became an incredible stepping
stone towards world peace. While the Summit can be seen by many as a failure, the effects of
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Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Strategic Defense Initiative played a massive
impact on nuclear talks and the eventual conclusion of the Cold War.
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